This morning, a mainstream opinion piece argued that the United States Marine Corps — fresh from celebrating its 250th birthday — should be abolished. The author claimed the Corps is “redundant,” “outdated,” and “unnecessary.” Every one of those assertions collapses the moment they are held up against history, current operations, strategic doctrine, or basic facts.

For Connecticut Veterans Bulletin, and for all who understand military reality rather than academic theory, these attacks are not only false — they are dishonorable. The Marine Corps has never been redundant, never been obsolete, and never been anything less than one of the most indispensable fighting forces in American history.

Below is a point-by-point dismantling of the arguments made by the article. Every accusation is addressed directly and proven wrong.

1. “The Marine Corps became redundant long ago.”

This claim ignores the fundamental reason the Marine Corps exists: Combined-arms naval expeditionary warfare, a mission no other service is structured, trained, or organized to perform.

The Army does not train or equip to deploy from ships.
The Navy does not seize and defend land.
The Air Force does not conduct amphibious forcible-entry operations.
Special Operations Command conducts raids, not sustained campaigns.

The Marine Corps is the only force capable of integrating sea-based logistics, aviation, armor, infantry, and support elements into one rapidly maneuverable expeditionary unit — the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). This is not redundancy. This is a capability unique in the world, relied upon by combatant commanders every single year.

2. “The Marine Corps’ usefulness peaked in World War II and faded in the nuclear age.”

A claim disproven by every major conflict of the modern era.

• Korea: The Marines executed the Inchon landing — considered one of the most brilliant operational maneuvers of the 20th century — and held the line at the Chosin Reservoir under impossible odds, saving the entire X Corps from annihilation.
• Vietnam: Marines fought battles like Hue City and Khe Sanh, where joint-service overlapping roles were not “redundancy,” but necessity in a massive theater of war.
• Cold War Operations: Lebanon, Grenada, Panama — every one required a fast-moving, ship-based force able to project combat power before the Army could deploy divisions from the continental United States.
• Global War on Terror: In Afghanistan and Iraq, Marines were the first conventional ground forces into Afghanistan and led the most intense urban combat operations in Iraq at Nasiriyah and Fallujah.

The Marine Corps has had at least four separate “peak” contributions since World War II. Obsolescence is not one of them.

3. “In Vietnam and later conflicts, Marine operations were indistinguishable from Army operations.”

Factually false.

The Marine Corps used its own doctrine, command structure, and combined-arms integration in Vietnam and every war afterward.

• The Marine Air-Ground Task Force remained fundamentally different from Army modular brigades.
• The Corps retained organic aviation support, which the Army still does not possess at the same scale.
• The Marines operated their own areas of operation and used their own operational playbook, from the civic-action “Combined Action Platoon” model in Vietnam to the distributed maneuver doctrine in Iraq.

If the author cannot differentiate Marine doctrine from Army doctrine, the failure lies with the author — not the Marine Corps.

4. “Rapid-reaction missions in the Cold War were symbolic, not strategically important.”

The Beirut evacuation, Grenada, and Panama were direct responses to real geopolitical crises, often preventing escalation.

The Marines’ ability to be forward-positioned aboard naval ships meant they were the only force capable of responding within hours, not weeks. A strategic-ready amphibious force is not symbolic — it is a global insurance policy.

When American citizens and diplomats must be rescued, nobody asks for a slower force that arrives next week.

5. “Landlocked Afghanistan and Iraq proved the Marines were irrelevant.”

Wrong.

The Marine Corps was:

• First into Afghanistan among conventional forces (15th and 26th MEU).
• The leading ground force in major battles of Iraq including:
  • An Nasiriyah
  • Najaf
  • Al Qaim
  • Fallujah (both battles)
• The primary force securing Helmand Province during the 2009 surge — a mission widely recognized as one of the hardest in the country.

Operating inland has always been a Marine mission. Marines fought far inland in World War I at Belleau Wood and Soissons. Distance from a coastline never defined Marine relevance.

6. “Today the Navy handles amphibious operations.”

This distorts reality.

The Navy provides the ships. The Marine Corps provides the Marines.
One does not replace the other; they are two halves of a required whole.

Without Marines, amphibious ships are empty hulls.
Without ships, Marines lose their forward-deployed expeditionary reach.

This is partnership — not duplication.

7. “The Army provides expeditionary ground forces, making the Marines redundant.”

The Army is not configured to:

• Deploy directly from ships
• Conduct forcible-entry amphibious assaults
• Sustain combat operations solely from sea-based logistics
• Operate an integrated aviation/ground/armor team under one command structure

Army Expeditionary Units require large bases, airfields, and supply chains.
Marine Expeditionary Units can fight from the sea without a single U.S. base in the region.

That difference defines expeditionary warfare.

8. “Marine aviation duplicates Air Force and Navy missions.”

Another falsehood.

Marine aviation exists for one reason: direct, organic support to Marine ground forces. This means:

• Marine pilots train specifically for Marine missions.
• Their aircraft operate under Marine ground commanders.
• Their doctrine is built around close air support within the Marine Air-Ground Task Force.

The Air Force trains for theater-level operations.
The Navy trains for sea control and fleet air defense.

Neither provides the continuous, organic, ground-commander-controlled air integration the Marines require.

9. “Force Design 2030 shows that Marines are trying desperately to stay relevant.”

Force Design 2030 is not desperation — it is innovation.

The Marine Corps is the only branch restructuring to counter China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy in the Pacific.

The Corps is creating:

• Stand-in forces
• Distributed long-range precision-strike teams
• Littoral regiments capable of operating inside contested zones
• Mobile anti-ship missile units that no other service fields at the same scale

Rather than mirroring the Navy or SOCOM, the Marines are integrating the sea and land fight in ways those services cannot. The Pacific strategy being adopted by U.S. Indo-Pacific Command depends heavily on the Marine Corps — not replacements for it.

10. “The Marine Corps costs too much for too little.”

The Marine Corps receives roughly 6% of the defense budget while performing:

• More global crisis-response missions than any other service
• More embassy reinforcement and evacuation missions
• More forward-deployed presence operations
• The entire nation’s amphibious forcible-entry capability

The argument that “the Marines cost too much” is disproven by the fact that they cost far less than the Army, Air Force, or Navy while handling missions no one else can.

The Marine Corps is the best dollar-for-capability investment in the entire Department of Defense.

11. “Public affection for the Marine Corps is based on ‘mythology.’”

The only mythology here is the claim that Marine reputation is manufactured.

The public respects the Marines because of:

• Belleau Wood
• Tarawa
• Iwo Jima
• Chosin
• Hue
• Beirut
• Fallujah
• Marjah
• Kabul evacuations
• Embassy rescues worldwide

You cannot fabricate 250 years of combat performance.
You cannot manufacture sacrifice.
You cannot invent honor.

The Marine Corps earned its standing in blood, discipline, and a level of excellence that no advertising campaign could replicate.

12. “Abolishing the Marine Corps would improve national security.”

Eliminating the Marine Corps would:

• Remove America’s only amphibious forcible-entry force
• Remove the only scalable crisis-response force that can deploy within hours
• Remove the only service with integrated aviation, logistics, and ground combat under one command
• Hamstring Indo-Pacific strategy against China
• Increase dependence on slower, more expensive deployment models
• Force other branches to redesign entire structures at far greater cost

Nothing about elimination improves readiness, strategy, or fiscal responsibility.

It would leave America weaker.

Conclusion: The Accusations Stand Refuted

Every claim in the article collapses under scrutiny because it attempts to treat one of the most efficient, flexible, and historically proven fighting forces in the world as if it were a museum exhibit.

The truth is simple:

The United States Marine Corps is not redundant.
It is not outdated.
It is not replaceable.
It is indispensable.

For 250 years, Marines have done what no one else could — and what America will always need someone to do. Any call to abolish them is not merely wrong; it is an abandonment of history, strategy, and common sense.

The Marine Corps does not owe its survival to myth.
It owes its survival to reality.

And reality proves every allegation against it false.

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